

article 19 of the WHO Constitution and legally binding on the parties.

(4) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB held its third meeting at which it accepted a conceptual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to prepare a zero draft for consideration at the INB's next meeting.

(5) In early January 2023, an initial draft of the Convention was sent to WHO member states in advance of its formal introduction at the fourth meeting of the INB. The draft includes broad and binding provisions, including rules governing parties' access to pathogen genomic sequences and how the products or benefits of such access are to be distributed.

(6) On February 27 through March 3, 2023, the INB held its fourth meeting at which it—

(A) formally agreed to the draft distributed in January as the basis for commencing negotiations; and

(B) established an April 14, 2023 deadline for member states to propose any changes to the text.

(7) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual states that when "determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole" and includes the following criteria to be considered when determining whether an international agreement should take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement:

(A) "The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole".

(B) "Whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws".

(C) "Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress".

(D) "Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements".

(E) "The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement".

(F) "The degree of formality desired for an agreement".

(G) "The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement".

(H) "The general international practice as to similar agreements".

(c) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) a significant segment of the American public is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organization, its leadership, and its independence from the pernicious political influence of certain member states, including the People's Republic of China;

(2) the Senate strongly prefers that any agreement related to pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response adopted by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;

(3) the scope of the agreement which the INB has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Director-General, is so broad that any application of the factors referred to in subsection (b)(11) will weigh strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and

(4) given the level of public distrust, any relevant new agreement by the World Health Assembly which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for Senate ratification should not be agreed to or implemented by the United States.

(d) APPLICABILITY OF SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

any convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the recommendations, report, or work of the International Negotiating Body established by the second special session of the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring.

SA 12. Mr. JOHNSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 3. AGREEMENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN DEEMED TREATIES SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.

(a) TREATY SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any agreement reached by the President with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran is deemed to be a treaty that is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States requiring that the treaty is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring.

(b) LIMITATION ON SANCTIONS RELIEF.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of sanctions under any other provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future, unless the agreement is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate as a treaty and receives the concurrence of two-thirds of Senators.

SA 13. Mr. SCOTT of Florida (for himself, Mr. TILLIS, and Mr. CASSIDY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a joint select committee of Congress to be known as the "Joint Select Committee on Afghanistan" (in this section referred to as the "Joint Committee").

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Joint Committee shall be composed of 12 members appointed pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) APPOINTMENT.—Members of the Joint Committee shall be appointed as follows:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the House of Representatives.

(3) CO-CHAIRS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Two of the appointed members of the Joint Committee shall serve as co-chairs. The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate shall jointly appoint one co-chair, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the minority leader of the Senate shall jointly appoint the second co-chair. The co-chairs shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) STAFF DIRECTOR.—The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall hire the staff director of the Joint Committee.

(4) DATE.—Members of the Joint Committee shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(5) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT.—Members shall be appointed for the life of the Joint Committee. Any vacancy in the Joint Committee shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the vacancy occurs, in the same manner as the original designation was made. If a member of the Joint Committee ceases to be a Member of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be, the member is no longer a member of the Joint Committee and a vacancy shall exist.

(c) INVESTIGATION AND REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Joint Committee shall conduct an investigation and submit to Congress a report on the United States 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A summary of any intelligence reports that indicated an imminent threat at the Hamid Karzai International Airport preceding the deadly attack on August 26, 2021, and the risks to United States and allied country civilians as well as Afghan partners for various United States withdrawal scenarios.

(B) A summary of any intelligence reports that indicated that withdrawing military personnel and closing United States military installations in Afghanistan before evacuating civilians would negatively affect the evacuation of United States citizens, green card holders, and Afghan partners and thus put them at risk.

(C) A full review of planning by the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense for a noncombatant evacuation from Afghanistan, including details of all scenarios used by the Department of State or the Department of Defense to plan and prepare for noncombatant evacuation operations.

(D) An analysis of the relationship between the retrograde and noncombatant evacuation operation plans and operations.

(E) A description of any actions that were taken by the United States Government to protect the safety of United States forces and neutralize threats in any withdrawal scenarios.